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TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; 
to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for 
redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and 
opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law. 
iv. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
THOMAS EUGENE DAVIS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 870221-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
The Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts are set 
forth in Appellant's Brief (Brief of Appellant at 1-5) with the 
exception of the state's concession that Mr. Davis "testified before 
the prosecutor under oath and provided detail regarding where he had 
obtained most of the money." (Brief of Respondent at 2 citing 
Findings no. 16 and 17/ R. at 125). Mr. Davis takes this 
opportunity to reply to portions of Respondent's Brief, issues to 
which Mr. Davis does not reply are adequately covered in Appellant's 
Opening Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court retained ongoing jurisdiction to examine 
the issue of return of property no longer needed as evidence. The 
statute in question unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to 
Mr. Davis and unconstitutionally fails to protect Mr. Davis' due 
process rights, in any event, Mr. Davis met his burden of proof 
regarding ownership of the money and therefore this Court ought to 
order the money be returned to Mr. Davis. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THE TRIAL COURT RETAINED ONGOING CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
TO EXAMINE THE ISSUE OF RETURN OF PROPERTY SEIZED 
DURING THE ARREST OF MR, DAVIS, 
Respondent urges this Court to adopt a civil standard for 
Mr. Davis's burden of proof regarding ownership and lawfulness of 
the property in question. (Respondent's Brief at 4, 7). He further 
indicates the standard and burden of proof would be the same whether 
the matter is argued in a hearing ancillary to the criminal trial or 
in a separate proceeding. Id. 
Although the matter should properly be considered 
criminal, even if this Court finds the action to be quasi-criminal 
in nature, the state must still provide the "basic tools of an 
adequate defense or appeal." Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 
227, 92 S.Ct. 431, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971), Little v. Streater, 452 
U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2202, 68 L.Ed.2d 627 (1981). In Little v. 
Streater, the Court extended the principal of meaningful 
participation to a quasi-criminal proceeding in holding that in a 
paternity action, the state could not deny the putative father blood 
grouping tests if he could not otherwise afford them. In State v. 
Manuel, 426 So.2d 140 (La. 1983) the court stated "no person may be 
subjected to forfeiture of property without the right of judicial 
review based on a complete record of all evidence upon which the 
judgment is based." Id. at 143 n.l. Therefore the state should pay 
for the preparation of a transcript in the present case. 
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POINT II, 
THE OPERATION OF UTAH CODE ANN, §77-24-2 
(1953 AS AMENDED) DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF HIS PROPERTY 
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS q>F LAWT 
A. THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE. 
Respondent erroneously states the statute in question 
provides for a hearing (Respondent's Brief at 6). Although a 
hearing was provided in the case at bar, the statute does not 
specifically provide for a hearing. Additionally, respondent 
provides no citation for his unsupported statement, "Here 
[A]ppellant was given detailed instructions concerning how he might 
obtain the return of what he alleged was his lawful property." 
(Respondent's Brief at 7). As conceded by the state, Mr. Davis 
explained how he legally obtained most of the money. (Respondent's 
Brief at 2). 
In State v. Manuel, 426 So.2d 1140, 143 (La. 1983), the 
court, in relying on the state constitution, found no person may be 
deprived of property without due process of law. Personal effects 
may not be taken at all unless they are contraband. The court found 
the Louisiana state constitution requires both notice and an 
opportunity to be heard and reasonable statutory restrictions and 
reasonable exercise of power for valid interference with property 
rights. The constitution "requirefd] the state to prove its grounds 
beyond a reasonable doubt in a judicial proceeding before . . . 
property may be forfeited. . . ." Id. at 145. Mr. Davis cites to 
Article I, Section 1 and 7 as comparable provisions in the Utah 
Constitution (Reply Brief at iv) which protect his rights to be 
secure in his property and to have redress of his grievances when he 
is deprived of property without due process of law. 
B. MR. DAVIS WAS DENIED DOE PROCESS PROTECTIONS 
BECAUSE HE WAS DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE 
THE MATTER DECIDED BY A NEUTRAL PARTY. 
Although Mr. Davis was provided a hearing reviewing the 
prosecutor's decision, the matter should have been heard by a 
neutral party in the first place. Placing the burden on Mr. Davis 
to show an abuse of discretion placed him in a more difficult 
position than merely showing he lawfully possessed the money in 
question. As noted by the Utah Supreme Court, ff[T]he prosecutor's 
good faith is a fragile protection for the accused." State v. 
Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986), cited again in State v. 
Ossana, 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 16 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring). The statute in question provides no protection other 
than the thin veil of the prosecutor's good faith. 
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 
232, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972) relied upon by Respondent 
in support of his due process argument is distinguishable from the 
present case. In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, the accused was 
acquitted of willfully and knowingly, with intent to defraud, 
smuggling articles into the United States. He then argued 
collateral estoppel to bar the pending forfeiture proceeding. The 
Court found the forfeiture proceeding was not barred because no 
intent was needed to prove the property was brought into the United 
States without proper declaration. Again, as noted in Mr. Davis' 
Opening brief, Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 6 S.Ct. 437, 
29 L.Ed. 684 (1886) controls because in Coffey, acquittal on the 
criminal offense necessarily embraced the intent averred in the 
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forfeiture suit. In other words-, where the evidence was 
insufficient to link Mr. Davis1 activities to forgery, the money 
cannot be considered sufficiently tainted to become derivative 
contraband or otherwise uphold the state's position. 
POINT III. 
MR. DAVIS MET THE BURDEN OP PROOF AT THE 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING HELD ON HIS MOTION TO 
COMPEL THE RETURN OF PROPERTY. 
As conceded by the state, Mr. Davis explained how he 
legally obtained most of the money. (Respondent's Brief at 2). 
Although the state had resources to verify or refute these claims 
and offered to do so, it failed to do so and failed to indicate any 
valid reason for failing to do so. (Appellant's Opening Brief at 
4). Therefore the state's argument that Mr. Davis merely made a 
"conclusory statement that he was the owner, backed by unsupported 
testimony of odd jobs" is without merit. To the contrary, the state 
relies in its brief on a case which indicates the rule regarding 
return of property "contemplates that the claimant, by his own 
testimony or affidavits, will show the court sufficient facts to 
convince it of his right to possession." State ex rel. Schillberg 
v. Everett District Justice Court, 585 P.2d 1177, 1182 (Wash. 1978) 
cited in Respondent's Brief at 10. Mr. Davis came forward both with 
an affidavit and testimony. (Appellant's Opening Brief at 15, 
Addendum A). The state could not refute his claims. 
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POINT IV. 
THE STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFTED THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF TO MR. DAVIS, THEREBY 
DENYING HIM HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
In the recent case of State v. Spooner, 42 Cr. L. 2362 
La. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 18, 1988 (Addendum A), the court struck down 
a forfeiture statute because due process concerns and state 
constitutional protections for property rights were violated by 
failing to require the state to bear the burden of proof. The 
statute presumed money seized in close proximity to illegal 
controlled substances shall be presumed forfeitable unless the owner 
proved otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. 
The Court in Spooner relied on the state due process 
clause to find that a property owner is entitled to a presumption of 
innocence similar to that afforded an accused in a criminal case. 
Because "forfeiture of derivative contraband^ is an exception to 
the basic right of an individual to own private property, the state 
necessarily must bear the burden of proving that the property in 
question qualifies as derivative contraband." 42 Cr. L. at 2364 
(emphasis in original). 
Mr. Davis urges this Court to find Article I Section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution compels the same result because the state has 
placed an unconstitutional burden on Mr. Davis. As in Spooner, the 
only evidence concerning the source of the money was that it was 
legally held by the person claiming a right to it. As in 
m Derivative contraband as defined by the Louisiana Court is 
property which is not intrinsically illegal but which is the 
immediate instrument of a crime, such as automobiles, guns, or 
currency. 42 Cr. L. at 2363. 
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Spooner, "The state did not satisfy any standard of proof, even [by] 
a preponderance of the evidence," 42 Cr. L. at 2364. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Davis requests this 
Court to reverse the trial court's decision to not compel the return 
of money seized from him at the time of his arrest. He further asks 
this case to be remanded to the trial court with an order that the 
trial court order the return of Mr. Davis' property. 
DATED this /S* day of March, 1988. 
& -
^LIZtyBETH K/ BOWMAN 
Attorney for .Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN, hereby certify that eight copies 
of the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 
South 500 East, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and four 
copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114, this /$ day of March, 1988. 
DELIVERED by 
March, 1988. 
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ADDENDUM A 
LOUISIANA STRIKES DOWN PRESUMPTION THAT 
CASH SEIZED NEAR DRUGS IS FORFEITABLE 
State must prove that cash is derivative 
contraband. 
Part of a forfeiture statute providing that cash seized 
in close proximity to illegal controlled substances is 
presumed to b4 forfeitable contraband unless the claim-
ant proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence is 
struck down by a majority of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court. Due pifocess concerns and state constitutional 
protections for property rights require that the state bear 
the burden of proof, the majority holds. (State v. 
Spooner, La Si^ pCt, 1/18/88) 
Property rights protected by the state constitution are 
more detailed than those guaranteed by the U.S. Consti-
tution, the ms^ority points out. Also, forfeiture's pur-
pose, penalizing the commission of a crime, makes it 
essentially criminal in nature, which calls for strong due 
process protections. For these reasons, the majority re-
affirms what it held several years ago: that forfeiture 
statutes are constitutional only if they require the state 
to prove that the property in question is forfeitable. The 
presumption created by the statute impermissibly re-
lieves the state of its burden, the majority concludes. 
Mere proximity of cash to illegal drugs may give rise to 
an inference that the cash is derivative contraband, but 
it cannot mandate such a presumption since there are 
too many other possibilities that could account for the 
presence of the cash. 
Concurring in the result, Justice Cole, joined by Jus-
tices Marcus and Watson, agrees that the presumption is 
unconstitutional. However, he argues that forfeiture is 
civil in nature and therefore would decide, as the major-
ity says it is unnecessary to do, that the state need only 
show the forfeitability of property by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
Digest of Opinion: Defendant Norman Spooner appeals an 
order under La.R.S. 32:1550(A)(7)(c) forfeiting $1400 cash 
found on his person. The statute provides that money seized in 
close proximity to illegal controlled substances shall be pre-
sumed to be forfeitable contraband unless the owner thereof 
proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. 
During the course of a lawful traffic stop, an officer became 
suspicious and asked the defendant if he could search his car. 
The defendant gave written consent. Two sets of scales contain-
ing cocaine residue and assorted pills, some of them controlled 
substances, were found. Following the defendant's arrest, the 
cash was discovered in his back pocket. The defendant pled 
guilty to possession of controlled dangerous substances, and the 
state filed a petition seeking forfeiture of the cash and auto-
mobile under §32:1550. 
Two generic categories of property may be classified as 
"contraband." Items the possession of which is intrinsically 
illegal, such as illegal narcotics, are contraband per se. Things 
subject to forfeiture because they are the immediate instru-
ment of a crime, but the possession of which is not intrinsically 
illegal, such as automobiles, guns, and currency, are derivative 
contraband. In order to obtain the forfeiture of derivative 
contraband, the statute requires the state to show that its value 
is greater than $500 or that the contraband was intended for 
commercial sale. 
At the forfeiture hearing, the state's witnesses testified 
concerning the items found in the car, that fact that ordinary 
buyers would have no need for scales and other paraphernalia 
found, that it was consistent for a dealer to have on hand 
"downers" that were found in the car for customers to ingest 
prior to taking cocaine, and that the presence of ledgers 
suggested that the defendant was a distributor. The defense 
called no witnesses, but a joint stipulation was entered that the 
defendant's father would have testified that he gave the de-
fendant $1500 two days before the search to travel to 
California. 
The trial court ordered the car and cash forfeited. It found 
that the seizure had been constitutional and that the state had 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the contraband was 
intended for commercial sale. With regard to the currency, the 
court found that the state was entitled to forfeiture because the 
defendant failed to rebut the presumption found in 
§ 1550(A)(7)(c) by clear and convincing evidence. 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the statute unconstitu-
tionally shifts the burden of proof to the defendant and that the 
state failed to sufficiently prove that the contraband was 
valued in excess of $500 or was intended for commercial sale. 
Because we agree with the trial court that the state proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the contraband was intended 
for commercial sale we need not consider the state's contention 
that it may satisfy the proof requirements of § 1550(C)(3) 
under a less rigorous evidentiary burden. We also agree that 
the automobile was being used to transport controlled sub-
stances for sale and is therefore forfeitable. We turn then to 
the presumption that currency found in close proximity to 
controlled substances is contraband. 
Under § 1550(A)(7)(c), based on the location of money at 
the time of arrest, the presumption arises that it was used to 
facilitate the trafficking of illegal drugs. The defendant may 
rebut the presumption only by showing by clear and convincing 
evidence that the money was not used to facilitate a drug law 
violation. 
In State v. Manuel, 426 So2d 140, 32 CrL 2362 (1983), we 
established guidelines for assessing the constitutionality of 
forfeiture proceedings. We noted that forfeiture proceedings 
are essentially criminal in nature because their primary pur-
pose is to penalize the commission of an offense. Thus, we said 
that a statutory scheme allowing forfeiture is constitutional if 
it permits the taking of property subject to the same precondi-
tions required for a seizure of criminal evidence. We further 
held that a condition of constitutionality is that the state prove 
the grounds for forfeiture at the evidentiary hearing. Id. at 
146-47. 
We also discussed the extensive limitations placed on the 
state's right to forfeit or take private property by Art. I, §4 of 
the state constitution. Although the right to acquire, own, and 
dispose of private property is subject to reasonable statutory 
restrictions and the police power, the section provides that 
"[pjroperty shall not be taken * * * except for public purposes 
and with just compensation * * *. Personal effects, other than 
contraband, shall never be taken." We concluded that forfei-
ture does not infringe upon protected property if it requires the 
state to prove that the alleged contraband was used "as an 
immediate instrument of crime," id. at 145, i.e., derivative 
contraband. 
Art. I, §2 of the state constitution provides that "[n]o person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due 
process of law." Although we do not attempt to delineate the 
full range of process due a defendant in a forfeiture proceed-
ing, we hold that the property owner is entitled to a presump-
tion of innocence similar to that afforded an accused in a 
criminal case. The burden of proving that the property is 
derivative contraband must be on the state. 
[Text] La. R.S. 32.1550(A)(7)(c) impermissibly relieves the 
state of its burden of proving that seized currency has been 
used as an instrumentality of a crime. In order to be entitled to 
the presumption that the money was used as an instrumentality 
of a crime, the state, under this statute, could rest its case on 
the issue after simply demonstrating that the seized currency 
was found "in close proximity" to illegal contraband. Such an 
evidentiary presumption is clearly invalid under the established 
rule of criminal law that mandatory presumptions may be 
sustained only if the prosecution can demonstrate that the 
presumed fact necessarily flows from the proven fact upon 
which it is made to depend. * * * The fact that this defendant 
was found to have $1,400 in cash in his pocket at the time 
illegal drugs were discovered in the trunk of the car he had 
been driving (the proven fact) does not in and of itself demon-
strate that the money was in any way connected with the drugs 
(the presumed fact). Proximity of the cash to the illegal 
substances is one factor which the state may rely on to prove 
that the money was used as an instrumentality of a crime. But 
while proximity may in some cases give rise to the inference 
that currency is derivative contraband, it cannot mandate a 
presumption that the money is contraband. There are too 
many other reasonable possibilities which could account for the 
presence of the cash * * * * * * 
We also find that placing the burden of proof on the 
claimant under a "clear and convincing evidence" standard 
violates due process guarantees provided by the United States 
Constitution. * * * [T]he federal approach allows the burden 
of persuasion to shift to the claimant upon an initial govern-
ment showing of probable cause to institute the proceeding. 
See e.g., U.S. v. $55,518.05 in United States Currency, 728 
F2d 192 (3rd Cir. 1984); United States v. $2,500 in United 
States Currency, 689 F2d 10 (2d Cir. 1982). However, these 
cases do not suggest that the burden may be imposed on the 
property owner to rebut the presumption of guilt by clear and 
convincing evidence. [End Text] 
2-17-88 0011-1341/88/$00.50 42 CrL 2363 
In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the U.S. 
Supreme Court identified three factors that should be consid-
ered in assessing whether a government deprivation complies 
with the dictates of federal due process: (I) the privald interest 
affected, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation, and (3) the 
government's interest in employing the challenged procedure. 
We find that the significant risk under the current statute that 
currency will be forfeited even though it is not derivative 
contraband outweighs the utility of the presumption; to the 
state. Accordingly, we do not believe that the statute survives 
constitutional scrutiny under Mathews. 
[Text/ We independently determine that § 1550(A)(7)(c) 
infringes upon the "far reaching" protections afforded to 
private property owners by the Louisiana Constitution * * * 
The basic right protected is the right to own and enjoy 
private property. Forfeiture of contraband per se is not an 
infringement on that right because an individual can have no 
ownership interest in items that are intrinsically illegal. Forfei-
ture of derivative contraband * * * also does not infringe on a 
protected interest because the right to own property "is subject 
to reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable ^xercise 
of the police power/' Art. I, §4. However, because forfeiture ol 
derivative contraband by the state is an exception to t^e basic 
right of an individual to own private property, the state 
necessarily must bear the burden of proving that the propert) 
in question qualifies as derivative contraband. [End Text/ 
Unquestionably the state did not prove that the currency wai 
contraband. The only evidence concerning the source of the 
money was the stipulation that it was given to the defendant b) 
his father. The amount was not so great as to itself arouse 
suspicion, especially when held by someone on a cross-countn 
trip. The state did not satisfy any standard of proof, even z 
preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we reverse th< 
judgment allowing forfeiture of the currency and remand for < 
new trial on that issue. — Calogero, J. 
Concurrence: I agree that the presumption established ii 
§ 1550(A)(7)(c) violates the state constitution, but believe th< 
issue is much closer than the majority suggests. Als|o, the 
majority should not have sidestepped the issue of the state* 
burden of proof: the state need only prove by a prepondjeranc 
of the evidence that the money sought to be forfe ted i 
derivative contraband because the forfeiture proceeding is civil 
not criminal. — Cole, Marcus, and Watson, JJ. 
(State v. Spooncr; La SupCt, No. 87-KK-0892. l/ift/«^f 
